Proportionate security
by Rob Corder on Friday, 09 March 2007
The British like to think themselves as among the best in the world at standing in line.
But in the summer of last year, faced with queues of over two hours at London airport, stiff upper lips curled, blood boiled, and elbows were sharpened as people fought their way towards security gates that stood between them and the flight that was about to take off without them.
I found myself in such a queue on more than one occasion as I flew back and forth between the UK and the Middle East.
Like many around me, I found myself wondering whether the new security regulations that caused the delays were really worth the aggravation they were creating.
Airport and airline security is a serious business. When it fails, the consequences are dramatic and devastating.
But no security system is flawless and inconsistencies can often make a mockery of them.
Why, for example, are glasses banned on airlines when any passenger can buy huge glass bottles in duty free? Why do liquids have to be visible in plastic bags if they are in hand luggage, but can be carried by the gallon in checked-in suitcases?
The answer to these, and many other oddities, lies in the fact that airport rules are as much about being seen to keep everybody secure, as they are about actually keeping people secure.
Authorities that are charged with designing the rules are also required to consider the cost of their solutions, the convenience to passengers, and economics of running an airport or an airline.
The last nine months in London airports illustrates the challenge perfectly. An alleged plot to blow up transatlantic airliners was discovered that involved the mixing of liquid chemicals onboard a plane in order to make an explosive.
All liquids were immediately banned from hand luggage; a simple enough rule, but its application was responsible for the misery of millions of passengers.
The British Civil Aviation Authority was forced to suspend its own rules that governed delays for security checks at London airports for five months.
The British Airport Authority then had to recruit and train an additional 1000 security personnel, and buy 30 more scanners so that queuing times would fall back within the rules laid down by the CAA.
BAA had to demolish shops in airport departure lounges to make space for additional security gates, causing a loss of revenue.
The cost of additional security and the revenue shortfall caused by demolishing shops has to clawed back from somewhere - almost certainly from the airlines, which will pass on the cost to passengers.
I do not advocate that all forms of airport security are pointless, but argue strongly that they ought to be proportionate and well-considered.
Knee jerk reactions to new threats are counter-productive, and play into the hands of extremists.
Terrorists do not win by killing 200 people at a time in a plane. They win by provoking a reaction that is disproportionate to the threat.
The British public demonstrated, following the July 7th bombings in London, that they did not need additional security to return to traveling across the capital by bus or tube. They showed that they would not be cowed by terrorists by getting straight back into their daily travel routines.
The same would be true if a plane was blown up over the Atlantic. I'm sure there would be a dip in bookings between London and New York, but most passengers would return to established travel patterns within weeks, if not months.
Proportionate response is a pillar of civilised society that has been forgotten in the West. Re-learning the art is crucial to winning back the initiative from terrorists.
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