By Ghassan Khatib
Ghassan Khatib is vice president for community outreach at Birzeit University, and a former Palestinian Authority minister of planning.
The ground offensive Israel began in the second week of its war against the Palestinian people in Gaza was expected and, once the air operation had begun, to some extent desired by both Israel and Hamas.
Hamas, at an obvious disadvantage in the aerial phase of the war, continued to threaten Israel with "serious consequences" if the land offensive should start. Israel meanwhile could not achieve its objectives by bombing from the air, making a ground offensive "unavoidable."
The diverse diplomatic efforts to stop the war, including those of the French, the Turks, the Russians, the Arab foreign ministers and in the Security Council (where Washington, Israel's staunch ally, vetoed any resolution) have so far failed because the battlefield is not ripe for a ceasefire. The two sides, Hamas and Israel, are not yet ready to end the confrontation.
Both seem confident that they are heading for victory. The irony is that the objectives of the two sides are not mutually exclusive.
Hamas' strategic objective with this war seems to be to assert itself as the main counterpart to Israel in Palestine, the party that decides on war or peace with Israel. This, after all, is the first war between Israel and the Palestinians that is not fought and led by Yasser Arafat and Fatah.
Hamas spokesman Mohammad Nazzal, commenting on the recent diplomatic efforts to end the war, reminded everybody that no matter who is trying to do what, it has to be understood that the "final word will be for the resistance movement" and not the "so-called legitimate leadership" in Ramallah.
The war on Hamas, which is a part of the regional political Islamic movement, is also allowing the different political Islamic groups in Arab countries to cultivate unprecedented Arab public sympathy for Hamas.
There is no doubt that the war is creating a situation less favourable to the so-called moderate camp. An early sign of this pressure is the statement by the Jordanian prime minister, Nader al-Dahabi, that Jordan might reconsider its relationship with Israel.
The attempt to gain some wider political capital was also illustrated by Hamas leader Osama Hamdan, who in an address to a rally in Syria declared that this war was not a war on Hamas or Gaza, but rather a war on the Islamic Umma (nation).
Israel's tactical objective with its offensive is not completely contradictory. Israel wants to end Hamas' capacity to launch rockets at Israel, or at least put enough military pressure on the movement that it will stop.
In addition, Israel wants to end the smuggling through the tunnels under the Gaza-Egypt border. But Israel understands that it cannot, at one and the same time, expect the tunnel smuggling to end and maintain its siege on the beleaguered Strip - a situation that would cause a humanitarian crisis unacceptable to the international community.
Hence, for Israel to succeed in its aims it also needs to end the siege of Gaza in some way - whether through the Israel-Gaza crossings, the Gaza-Egypt crossing or both. In other words, Israel can succeed only if the key Hamas demand for a ceasefire, an end to the siege, is also met.
Israel would prefer any end to the siege to be conducted through the Rafah crossing, thus fulfilling another strategic aim: that of making Gaza Egypt's responsibility.
Such an outcome would enable the Israeli government, in which foreign affairs minister Tzipi Livni and prime minister Ehud Barak are both hoping to continue after general elections in February, to claim victory. Ditto Hamas, which will survive, keep its power intact and secure an end to the siege.
The main losers will be the civilians of Gaza, in addition to the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. Apparently the civilian casualties, almost exclusively on the Palestinian side, are a price both Hamas and Israel are willing to pay to achieve their respective victories.
Tragically, this is possible only because influential governments, particularly the United States and those of the EU, by condoning Israel's aggression as "defensive," are closing their eyes to the unfolding war crimes that are being committed. This makes them indirectly responsible.